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Abstract 
 
In this study, the real demand for global and local environmental protection in Beijing, 
China, is elicited and investigated. Participants from Beijing were offered the opportunity 
to contribute to voluntary climate change mitigation by purchasing permits from two 
Chinese CO2 emissions trading schemes (ETS). Purchased permits were withdrawn from 
the ETS. Since CO2 emissions mitigation is inevitably linked to other local benefits like 
the reduction in emissions of air pollutants, the aim of our study is to establish the 
demand for local and global environmental protection. To this end, Beijing and Shenzhen 
ETS permits were offered. The result is that at low prices the demand for Beijing ETS 
permits is significantly higher than for Shenzhen ETS permits indicating that a substantial 
part of the revealed demand for voluntary climate change mitigation in Beijing is driven 
by concerns for local co-benefits of CO2 emissions reduction. Our research identifies the 
important role of private benefits in the voluntary provision of the global public good 
climate change mitigation and provides first experimental evidence for China. 
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1 Introduction 
Local air pollution is one of the most urgent environmental problems in emerging countries. 
China is a prominent example. Here, coal combustion, originating from industry, power 
generation and residential sources, is the single largest source of air pollution-related health 
impacts, and is estimated to have contributed to 366,000 premature deaths in China in 2013 
(HEI 2016). The most harmful local pollutants emitted from Chinese coal-fired power plants 
are SO2, NOX and particulate matter (PM2.5/10) (Zhao et al. 2008). The different 
meteorological, geographic and climatic conditions as well as the differences in the intensity 
of emissions results in the concentration of local pollutants differing considerably across the 
country. Fine particulate matter PM2.5, for example, is a major cause of air pollution and the 
local concentrations in Chinese cities are substantially different across the country; these are 
typically much higher than in cities of developed countries.1  
However, China does not only struggle with severe local environmental problems. The 
country is also the world’s largest emitter of CO2. Since climate change mitigation is a global 
public good, a strong free-rider incentive exists which make an international cooperative 
solution highly unlikely. There is, however, an intense debate about private “co-benefits” 
from climate change mitigation. According to the IPCC (2014a), co-benefits are defined as 
the positive effects that a policy or measure aimed at one objective might have on other 
objectives. Co-benefits are also referred to as ancillary benefits. Deng et al. (2017) provide a 
systematic review of the fast growing research on co-benefits of reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions and classify them by co-benefit type, mitigation sector, and geographic scope. Co-
benefits from climate change mitigation policies include impacts on ecosystems, economic 
activity, air pollution, health, resource efficiency, energy security, and technological spillover 
and innovation. Some of these co-benefits of climate mitigation are clearly local. According 
to the IPCC (IPCC 2014b, p. 63), for example, “[climate] mitigation scenarios … are 
associated with significant co-benefits for air quality and related human health”.  
These co-benefits from air pollution and health are particularly relevant for emerging 
countries with weak regulation of local pollutants. Therefore, it is expected that countries such 
as China have, beside their limited primary incentives to contribute to the global public good 
climate change mitigation, an additional incentive to mitigate CO2 emissions as those 
emissions reductions are inevitably linked to reductions of local pollutants (Haines 2017, 
                                                 
1 As an example: According to WHO data (for 2013/14) the annual mean for PM2.5 and PM10 in Beijing 
(Shenzhen) was 85 and 108 µg/m3 (34 and 61 µg/m3). In Berlin, Germany, the annual mean was 16 and 10 
µg/m3 (WHO 2016). 
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Zhang et al. 2017a). The reduction of coal use through a carbon tax or an emissions trading 
system, for example, would lead to co-benefits from less PM2.5/10 or SO2. Thus, from the 
Chinese perspective there are private co-benefits at the local level from contribution to the 
global public good and China’s contribution to climate change mitigation might be partly 
motivated by these local co-benefits. 
Against this background, the central research question of our paper is whether it is possible to 
isolate and quantify local co-benefits from climate change mitigation in real individual 
behavior. For this purpose, we apply a revealed preference framework and make use of the 
initiation of seven pilot emissions trading schemes (ETS) in China (Jotzo and Löschel 2014). 
Participants from Beijing were offered the opportunity to contribute to voluntary climate 
change mitigation by purchasing permits from two separate sub-national Chinese CO2 
emissions trading schemes in Beijing and Shenzhen. Purchased permits were withdrawn from 
the respective ETS. Hence, CO2 emissions are reduced locally in the respective region leading 
to local co-benefits. However, due to the distance between both sub-national trading schemes 
(Shenzhen is situated more than 2000 km south of Beijing) it is highly unlikely that reduced 
CO2 emissions in Shenzhen cause positive co-benefits in Beijing. On the other hand, the 
effects of the mitigation of CO2, a uniformly mixed fund pollutant whose damage depends 
only on the total amount of CO2 in the atmosphere, not on the location of the emission, are 
identical in both cases. As the CO2 emissions reduction only leads to a reduced imposition of 
local air pollutants or other local co-benefits for our participants in Beijing, we are able to 
establish the real demand for global as well as for local environmental protection. To our 
knowledge, we provide the first empirical assessment of the willingness to contribute to 
additional global and local environmental protection based on an experimental approach. 
Our main results can be summarized as follow: (i) Contrary to standard economic theory, 
Chinese individuals contribute to CO2 reduction even though marginal benefit of contributing 
is zero while costs are positive. (ii) There is an additional demand for CO2 reduction 
stemming from local co-benefits, i.e. more individuals contribute to climate mitigation and the 
median willingness to pay is higher when local co-benefits are taken into account. Our results, 
thus, support the hypothesis that China has an additional motivation in contributing to 
mitigate climate change. For small prices up to the median, the willingness to pay for CO2 
reduction is even mainly driven by these local co-benefits. (iii) The proportion of subjects 
who contribute to climate change mitigation quickly decreases with price. In contrast to recent 
literature from developed countries, the demand for CO2 reduction in China seems to be rather 
elastic. 
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the related literature. The experimental 
design is described in Section 3. In Section 4 we derive hypotheses regarding individual 
behavior. We discuss our results in Section 5, before concluding in Section 6. 
2 Related literature 
In economics literature, public goods are regularly treated as pure public goods, characterized 
by perfect non-excludability and non-rivalry, although most public goods are not “purely 
public”. The main reason for doing so is the simplicity of pure public goods analysis. In 
reality, almost every global public good provision represents a joint production of several 
characteristics of different degrees of publicness, i.e. global public goods production is 
usually an impure public goods production. Mitigating climate change as a global public good 
may serve as an example as it is neither entirely non-rivalrous nor non-excludable. Besides 
the primary benefits from reducing CO2 emissions, private co-benefits such as reduced local 
air pollution are generated. Figure 1 describes our underlying approach based on theoretical 
impure public good models (Rübbelke 2003, Cornes and Sandler 1994).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Primary and co-benefits from climate change mitigation 
 
As the experiment was conducted in Beijing, we use this as our baseline treatment (termed 
Beijing) and the economic activity can be represented by the reduction of the cap of the 
Beijing ETS by 1 tCO2. The corresponding CO2 abatement generates two benefits for these 
subjects: A primary (public) benefit from the reduction of CO2 emissions and (private) co-
benefit, e.g. from reducing local air pollution, based on their geographic proximity. In our 
secondary treatment (termed Shenzhen), subjects were offered the opportunity to reduce the 
cap by 1 tCO2 for the Shenzhen ETS; in this case it can be assumed that the sole benefit of 
Reduction of Shenzhen ETS cap by 1 tCO2 
 
CO2 abatement in Shenzhen 
Pure public characteristic: 
reduction of CO2 emissions 
 
 
 
 
Primary benefits 
 
Private characteristic 
e.g. reduction of PM2.5/10 emissions 
in Beijing 
 
 
 
Co-benefits 
Reduction of Beijing ETS cap by 1 tCO2 
 
CO2 abatement in Beijing 
Pure public characteristic: 
reduction of CO2 emissions 
 
 
 
 
Primary benefits 
 
Source: Own illustration based on Rübbelke (2003) 
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such a transaction is that of the generation of a public good provision on account of the 
distance between the two cities.  
Let us briefly consider the decision situation from this stylized theoretical perspective. 
Assume that there are two distant locations,   and  . In our case,   denotes Beijing and  
Shenzhen. Consider location . The utility of a representative agent in location  is 
, , 	
 ≔  +  + 	
 +  + 		 
where   is the agent ’s income,   is the environmental good produced in  , and 	  the 
environmental good produced in  . The first utility component   is obtained as the 
indirect utility function, when we assume that the representative agent maximizes her standard 
utility function being defined over the vector of consumption goods given her income  and 
the market prices of these consumption goods (see, e.g., Ebert 1993, 2003). The 
environmental good is CO2 emissions reduction. The agent’s utility depends on the sum of 
CO2 emissions reductions in  and , which gives the second utility component
 
 + 	
. 
Reducing CO2 emissions at  or  also (linearly) lowers local emissions at  or , respectively, 
which is represented by the third utility component  + 		
, i.e. the private co-benefits 
of public good provision. The parameter 	 is the impact or distance coefficient describing 
the effects of emissions reductions in  on . Since both locations are assumed to be far away 
from each other we can assume 0 < 	 < 1.2 
Given , , 	 we now ask how much of her income agent  would be willing to spend at 
most to obtain an additional marginal unit of the public good produced at the same location . 
This maximum willingness to pay   is determined by the condition that utility 
, , 	
 of agent  is kept constant, i.e. that the condition  


 +   = 0  
is satisfied. Hence, the marginal willingness to pay is given by 
  =


=  ⁄ ⁄ =
"#$%
$&#$%%

'#
  
The   can be interpreted as the virtual price of the environmental good, i.e. if  were a 
market good, the consumers would be willing to pay this price for another unit (Baumgärtner 
et al. 2017). The marginal willingness to pay for the environmental good relates the marginal 
                                                 
2 Since Shenzhen is situated at the coast of the South China Sea more than 2,000 km south of Beijing, and the 
concentrations of local air pollutants in Shenzhen are rather low, in our case 	  is close to zero. See, e.g., Sun et 
al. (2015) for potential source contribution functions for fine particles in China.  
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benefit of an additional unit of  with the marginal cost of forgone consumption. This is the 
point of departure for our experimental approach.  
For an emissions reduction in  the marginal willingness to pay for an increase of 	 for an 
agent in location  is given accordingly by  
 % =
"#$%
$%&#$%%

'#
  
If 0 < 	 < 1,   >  % . With 	 ⟶ 0 as in our case, the marginal willingness to 
pay for the agent in location  for CO2 emissions reduction in ,  , is derived from the 
public good utility as well as from the private co-benefits of public good provision via, e.g., 
emissions reductions of local pollutants in  only. The marginal willingness to pay for CO2 
emissions reduction in  for a consumer in ,  %, is derived from the public good utility 
alone. 
The empirical literature on impure public goods is extremely limited. Heisey et al. (1997) and 
Midler et al. (2015) investigate impure public good problems such as biodiversity in an 
agricultural context. Munro and Valente (2016) show by means of a laboratory experiment 
that green goods with impure public good characteristics do not necessarily enhance 
environmentally friendly behavior. Finally, Kotchen and Moore (2007) investigate why 
subjects participate in green-electricity programs and how a program’s incentives affect 
participation.  
There are, however, at least two other branches of empirical literature directly related to our 
study. First are the several revealed preferences studies which have recently explored the 
question of individual demand for voluntary climate change mitigation and derived WTP for 
climate change mitigation in monetary units per tCO2. Löschel et al. (2013) sold EU ETS 
permits at different prices to a sample of 202 subjects selected from the population of 
Mannheim, Germany. A median WTP of zero and a mean WTP of 12 €/tCO2 is found. A 
similar framed field experiment with cash incentives was conducted by Diederich and 
Goeschl (2014) who determined the willingness to abate one tCO2 among the German 
Internet-using population. They estimate a zero median WTP and a mean WTP of about 6 
€/tCO2. Diederich and Goeschl (2017) estimated the elasticity of the probability of 
contributing to CO2 abatement for a German sample and found on average an inelastic price 
reaction. They conclude that, for Germany, using public funds to subsidize voluntary 
contributions to CO2 abatement is not economically meaningful. Using a similar revealed 
preference approach Uehleke and Sturm (2017) and Löschel et al. (2017) investigated whether 
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the individual contribution to the global public good climate change mitigation depends on 
different degrees of collective action. 
Secondly, there is an increasing number of papers devoted to the impact of local air pollution 
in emerging countries such as China on health and well-being from an economic perspective. 
Barwick et al. (2017) quantified the health impacts of PM2.5 in China and estimate consumer 
WTP for improved air quality. He et al. (2016) estimated the impact of PM10 on mortality 
during the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing. Du et al. (2016) evaluated the impact of air 
pollution on life satisfaction. Using disaggregated air pollution data for SO2, NO2, PM2.5/10 
and geo-coded individual respondents from original survey data, they showed that all four 
pollutants have significantly negative impacts on life satisfaction (see also Zhang et al. 2017b 
for a similar study).  
Our study extends the literature by an innovative revealed preference approach to assess local 
co-benefits of climate change mitigation. Exploiting the existence of sub-national Chinese 
ETS, it is based on individual purchase decisions for Chinese ETS permits in two distant 
locations. Thereby, our approach opens a new way to the empirical evidence on local co-
benefits from climate change mitigation.  
3 Experimental design 
The aim of our study was to investigate the extent to which a sample of the Beijing population 
would be willing to contribute to additional global and local environmental protection from 
their own disposable income. To elicit the demand for environmental protection, an 
experimental approach of asking people to give up real money instead of a survey approach 
was implemented. In order to address the impure public good problem both Beijing and 
Shenzhen ETS were employed as vehicles and emissions reductions were directly sold to the 
subjects. The main characteristics of both ETS are described in Table 1. For our purpose, it is 
particularly relevant that the ETS cap is binding, i.e. the price is positive, and the schemes are 
not linked. This means that by reducing the cap by 1 tCO2 in Beijing or Shenzhen we can be 
sure that CO2 emissions are reduced by that amount in the respective ETS region.  
 
Table 1: Basic facts on Beijing and Shenzhen ETS 
ETS Annual cap 
in mtCO2 
Covered 
entities 
Main sectors covered Average price 
in RMB/tCO2 
Beijing 55 543 Electricity, heating, cement, petrochemical and 
other industries, large public buildings 
49 
Shenzhen 30 635 Electricity, building, manufacturing,  
water supply 
29 
Sources: Zhang et al. (2017a) and personal communication with staff from the Shenzhen ETS. Data for 2016.  
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This section presents the experimental procedures, whereby the baseline treatment Beijing is 
used as a reference. Modifications in the second treatment Shenzhen are also explained. 
Participants were recruited by the University of International Business and Economics (UIBE 
Beijing, China) following the random distribution of approximately 8,000 letters of invitation 
within the 5th ring of Beijing city, supplemented by a random online call-for-participation 
using the so-called WeChat service (see Appendix 1 for details). The information that people 
received at this stage was that a survey would be carried out in which they would have the 
opportunity to buy products and that they would receive remuneration of 300 RMB (about 40 
€) for their time.3 Registration was done via telephone. To avoid subjects overstating their 
demand due to windfall money, the invitation letter emphasized that the amount of 300 RMB 
was explicitly remuneration for participation in the survey and their travel expenses. 
To elicit the individual demand a simple and incentive compatible market mechanism was 
chosen (see Appendix 2 for instructions): Each participant was confronted with six different 
prices for permits in 1 tCO2 units ordered from ‘high’ to ‘low’. Subjects had to decide 
whether they would be willing to buy at each of the prices. Finally, one of the six prices was 
randomly and openly selected by rolling a dice and the transaction was carried out at the 
corresponding price in privacy. Participants who did not wish to buy at a specific price 
indicated this with “NO”. 
The experiment took place in March 2017 in the labs of the UIBE in Beijing, China. A total of 
317 participants took part in the experiment and were randomly allocated to 11 sessions (each 
with between 17 and 32 participants). The steps of the experiment are listed in Table 2 below. 
At the beginning of each session, participants received 300 RMB in cash and signed and 
confirmed that they would obey the rules given by the research staff during the study (see 
letter of understanding in Appendix 1).  
 
                                                 
3 According to Beijing Municipal Bureau of Statistics, the GDP per capita in Beijing in 2015 is 106,497 RMB 
(292 RMB per day). The average wage of workers in Beijing in 2016 is 92,477 RMB (253 RMB per day).  
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Table 2: Steps of the experiment 
# Step Explanation 
1 Welcome Issuing of instructions and hand-out of 300 RMB, confirmation of compliance 
with rules 
2 Questionnaire I Socio-economic characteristics and attitudes towards climate change 
3 General information Explanation and presentation of the purchase procedure 
4 Comprehension test Example of purchase decision 
5 Information I  Climate change and co-benefits from CO2 reduction 
6 Information II Beijing/Shenzhen ETS (depending on the treatment) 
7 Purchase decision Indicate for each price out of a set of six prices whether you are willing to 
buy or not 
8 Questionnaire 2  Expectations, opinions about climate policy and social norms 
9 Public price draw Random selection of one price via rolling a dice 
10 Payment Subjects pay their stated prices in private 
11 Leave the university  
 
Participants were asked to choose a desk from which to answer the survey and the instructions 
were then distributed. Participants were not permitted to communicate with one another. A 
research administrator and two research assistants were on hand during each session to clarify 
any questions that arose with the participant concerned. Each session lasted for approximately 
90 minutes. At first, participants completed an initial questionnaire enquiring into their socio-
economic characteristics and attitudes towards climate change. The purchasing procedure was 
then explained by use of instructions (see Appendix 2). Additionally, participants witnessed a 
first presentation of a tangible (but unrelated to CO2 permits) example of the market 
mechanism and were asked to fill out a short test as verification of their understanding of the 
procedure. The explanation of the purchasing rule was included in the instructions. Following 
this stage, participants received information about (i) climate change and its effects on the 
environment and human society, including co-benefits from reduced emissions of local air 
pollutants, and (ii) the Beijing or Shenzhen ETS (depending on the treatment, see below). In 
the information about the ETS, emphasis was placed on the fact that buying and withdrawing 
permits reduces the ETS cap and thus CO2 emissions. 
Finally, participants were informed that they had the opportunity to buy permits in 1 tCO2 
units with their own money and could therefore contribute to the overall reduction of CO2 
emissions. Participants were reassured that all transactions would be carried out and that the 
final purchases and withdrawing of permits would be announced on the UIBE webpage.4  
In order to make individual CO2 emissions more tangible, participants were provided with a 
second presentation with three specific examples of activities resulting in emissions of 
                                                 
4 See weblink http://rigvc.uibe.edu.cn/yjyxw/60455.htm. 
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1 tCO2.5 Thereafter, each participant was asked to indicate whether they would be willing to 
purchase the permit at each of the six different prices. Finally, participants completed a 
second questionnaire answering questions about expectations regarding others’ behavior and 
the recent price for CO2 certificates, general opinions regarding climate policy and social 
norms. After the public price draw, participants left the room and the university individually. 
Subjects who had announced purchases of 1 tCO2 permits paid the corresponding amount of 
money they had stated in the survey. 
In treatment Beijing, subjects were given the opportunity to buy 1 tCO2 in Beijing ETS at six 
different prices, both in scenarios with higher prices (“high”) and lower prices (“low”) (see 
Table 3). In treatment Shenzhen, analogously, 1 tCO2 from Shenzhen ETS was sold. Subjects 
only took part in one treatment (“between-subjects design”). 
 
Table 3: Number of respondents in each treatment 
  Treatment  
  Beijing Shenzhen ∑ 
Price vector Low 107 49 156 High 155 46 161 
 ∑ 222 95 317 
Note: In the treatment Beijing Beijing ETS certificates were sold. In treatment Shenzhen Shenzhen ETS 
certificates were sold. In Beijing 60 subjects for each price vector faced a 2nd decision situation after their 
purchase decision. This 2nd decision situation is not considered here. The low (high) price vector is in RMB: {2, 
9, 20, 35, 70, 200} ({5, 14, 27, 45, 100, 300}). 
 
The total quantity of allowances purchased by the participants equated to 60 tCO2 (incl. 
Beijing ETS 55 tCO2 and Shenzhen ETS 5 tCO2). This amount of permits was bought and 
then deleted.6 The revenue collected by those subjects who completed transactions totaled 
1,184 RMB. The entire process was published at the UIBE webpage. 
4 Hypotheses 
We start the discussion of the hypothesized behavior with the treatment Shenzhen. Since 
subjects living in Beijing are barely affected by co-benefits in Shenzhen such as reduced local 
air pollution, contributions in this treatment are in practice solely motivated by climate change 
concerns (see our stylized theoretical framework in Section 2). Standard economic theory 
based on selfishness predicts zero contributions to the global public good of climate change 
                                                 
5 The following examples for activities generating 1 tCO2 were chosen: (i) a 7,200 km driving with a VW 
Lavida 1.4 TSI, (ii) the electricity consumption of one person in 870 days, and (iii) 13.2% of the annual average 
per capita CO2 emissions in China. 
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mitigation, as marginal benefit of contributing is zero while costs are positive. Accordingly, 
the proportion of subjects who buy certificates, *+,-., is zero. However, there is considerable 
empirical evidence from previous revealed preferences studies (Löschel et al. 2013, Diederich 
and Goeschl 2014 2017, Uehleke and Sturm 2017) and the literature on donations (e.g. 
Andreoni 1990), that shows that contributions in such decision situations are positive. On the 
one hand, positive contributions can be explained by moral motivations, which are associated 
with contributing to the public good itself rather than with the effect of the contribution 
(Cooper et al. 2004). For example, subjects could receive a ‘warm glow’ of giving (Crumpler 
and Grossman 2008), could buy moral satisfaction instead of ascribing an economic value to 
the public good (Kahneman and Knetsch 1992), gain from a positive self-image (Johansson-
Stenman and Svedsäter 2010), or follow deontological decision rules that cause them to 
disregard consequences and instead decide on the basis of morally mandated duties to ‘do the 
right thing’ (Spash 2006). This behavior can be described as unconditionally cooperative. On 
the other hand, it is possible that some subjects are willing to contribute only under the 
condition that others also do so (e.g. Sugden 1984, Fischbacher et al. 2001). In our design, 
subjects had to build their own expectations regarding the behavior of other subjects and, 
consequently, only those conditionally cooperative subjects who expected that others would 
also “bear their share” would contribute. However, since free-riding within the group is 
possible, strong incentives exist to understate the demand for the public good. 
Based on these considerations, we can state our first hypothesis H1 regarding *+,-. , the 
proportion of subjects who buy: 
Hypothesis H1:    /0: *34,564,5+,-. = 0 vs. /7: *34,564,5+,-. > 0. 
Due to the local co-benefits from climate change mitigation in Beijing, subjects in this 
treatment should have an additional incentive to contribute compared to treatment Shenzhen. 
This effect is also illustrated by our theoretical considerations in Section 2. However, also the 
provision of cleaner air as an example for local co-benefits represents a (local) public good 
and the marginal benefit of contributing is virtually zero in this decision situation. Thus, it is 
an empirical question whether and to what extent subjects react to the treatment effect. 
Therefore, we derive our second hypothesis H2:  
Hypothesis H2:    /0: *8,	5+,-. = *34,564,5+,-.  vs. /7: *8,	5+,-. > *34,564,5+,-. . 
                                                                                                                                                        
6 The real costs for purchasing the 55tCO2 in April 2017 in Beijing ETS were 55tCO2 x 39.8 RMB/tCO2 = 2,189 
RMB; and the 5tCO2 in August 2017 in Shenzhen ETS were 5tCO2 x 24.8 RMB/tCO2 = 124 RMB; totaling of 
2,313 RMB. 
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In the case that subjects contribute, we nevertheless would expect that the “law of demand” 
holds, i.e. the price should have a negative effect of the proportion of subjects who buy. This 
is our third hypothesis H3, which holds for both treatments:  
Hypothesis H3:    /0: no price effect on *+,-. vs. /7: *+,-. decreases with price. 
5 Results 
5.1 Pool of participants and their environmental attitudes 
Tables A3_3a-3k in Appendix 3 present the participants’ socio-economic characteristics. Our 
subject pool covers all age groups from 18-75 years for men as well as for women. The 
sample is, however, characterized by an underrepresentation of male subjects in general and 
subjects in the age group 40-49 years. Furthermore, subjects with higher education 
(undergraduate or higher) are overrepresented in our sample.7 
Table A3_1b in Appendix 3 presents participants’ attitudes towards climate change (see also 
Table 7). 39% of our subjects are concerned about human-induced climate change. 
Meanwhile, 75% of the sample are concerned about local air pollution caused by pollutants in 
the north (incl. Beijing) but only 18% are concerned about local air pollution caused by 
pollutants in the south (incl. Shenzhen). There is a statistically significant difference between 
the concern about local air pollution in the north (incl. Beijing) and in the south (incl. 
Shenzhen) (Wilcoxon matched pairs test, p-value < 0.001). 
5.2 Univariate analysis of the treatment effect 
In a first step, we compare individual behavior in the treatments Beijing and Shenzhen by 
defining two types: (i) Subjects do not buy for any price (“no contribution” – noC), and (ii) 
subjects buy for at least one price (“contribution” – C). Based on the distribution of types (see 
Figure 2), we can state that in both treatments the proportion of C-types is clearly above zero. 
Furthermore, the increase in C-types from 44% in Shenzhen to 64% in Beijing is significant 
(exact Fisher test, p-value = 0.001). Thus, we can reject our null hypotheses in H1 and H2. 
 
                                                 
7 All comparisons concerning representativeness are based on Chi2 tests with p<0.05 level of significance. The 
population of the city of Beijing (census data from 2010) is the population of interest. 
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Figure 2: Types in treatments Beijing and Shenzhen 
 
In the next step, we analyze subjects’ implicit willingness to pay (WTP). For this purpose we 
denote the highest price a subject  is willing to accept as minimum WTP ( 5). For 
subjects who do not buy at any price we set  5 = 0.8  
 
Table 4: 9:;<=> for treatments Beijing and Shenzhen 
in RMB Min ?@ Median Mean ?A Max n 
Beijing 0.00 0.00 5.00 12.35 14.00 300.00 211 
Shenzhen 0.00 0.00 0.00 13.03 9.00 300.00 93 
 
The descriptive statistics for  5 are shown in Table 4. While the median  5 in 
treatment Beijing is 5 RMB, it is 0 RMB in Shenzhen. This difference is also significant (two-
sided MWU test, p-value = 0.0199). There is no difference regarding the mean  5 (two-
sided t-test, p-value = 0.874). This result shows that for small prices, i.e. in the range [2, 5], 
the change of the treatment from Shenzhen to Beijing has a positive effect on the WTP. To put 
it another way, the median WTP for permits is completely determined by the preference for 
local co-benefits of CO2 emissions reduction. 
 
                                                 
8 Subjects who do not behave in an economically consistent manner, i.e. who have a partially increasing demand 
function (4%), are excluded from this analysis. 
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Figure 3: Price and proportion of subjects who buy for treatments Beijing and Shenzhen 
 
In the third step, we calculate the share of buyers of certificates, *.-,B.,5.+,-. , per price in each 
treatment. Figure 3 shows for both treatments, Beijing and Shenzhen, the proportion of 
subjects who buy, i.e. *8,	5+,-.  and *34,564,5+,-. , for each of the 12 different prices. The demand 
curves do not decrease monotonically, but the fitted values show a clear downward trend as 
prices increase. The difference in proportions between both treatments is quite large for low 
prices, in particular for the price range [2, 5]. Here, the proportion of subjects who buy in 
treatment Beijing is about 20 percentage points higher than in Shenzhen. For larger prices, i.e. 
the range [9, 300], the demand curves overlap for many prices, suggesting that the treatment 
effect is only valid for low prices. In general, the proportion of subjects who buy for prices 
above 45 RMB is quite low in both treatments.  
We test the null hypothesis of independence between the purchase decision in Beijing and 
Shenzhen with the Fisher exact test for count data (see Table 5). For all prices in Beijing in 
22.1% of all cases subjects purchase certificates compared to 17.9% in Shenzhen (p-value = 
0.042). Testing at the individual price level leads to a differentiated picture. For the smallest 
price of both price vectors we can reject the null hypothesis at least at a 10% level of 
significance (at  = 2 with p-value = 0.040 and at  = 5 with p-value = 0.054). Thus, there is 
weak statistical evidence that for low prices in the range [2, 5] subjects purchase permits more 
often in Beijing than in Shenzhen. For [9, 300] there are no significant effects. Since 
observations for  = 2  and  = 5  are independent, we can jointly test whether the null 
hypothesis of independence between the purchase decision in Beijing and Shenzhen can be 
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rejected. From the 173 purchase decisions in this price range 133 (76.9%) took place in 
Beijing and 40 (23.1%) in Shenzhen. Of the 144 no-buy-decisions 89 (61.8%) occurred in 
Beijing and 55 (38.2%) in Shenzhen. For both prices, the null hypothesis of independence 
between the purchase decision in Beijing and Shenzhen can be rejected at a p-value = 0.004 
(Fisher exact test). 
 
Table 5: Proportion of subjects who buy for treatments Beijing and Shenzhen 
  *8,	5+,-.  n *34,564,5+,-.  E p-value 
2 0.589 107 0.408 49 0.040 
5 0.609 115 0.435 46 0.054 
9 0.364 107 0.265 49 0.273 
14 0.287 115 0.261 46 0.847 
20 0.252 107 0.204 49 0.550 
27 0.200 115 0.196 46 1 
35 0.103 107 0.102 49 1 
45 0.139 115 0.130 46 1 
70 0.037 107 0.041 49 1 
100 0.061 115 0.087 46 0.512 
200 0.000 107 0.000 49 NA 
300 0.009 115 0.022 46 0.491 
Total 0.221 1332 0.179 570 0.042 
Note: Two-sided Fisher exact test for count data. 
 
Thus, we can summarize that the proportion of subjects who buy is positive for almost all 
prices and quickly decreases with price. Null hypotheses in H1 and H3 therefore must be 
rejected. Furthermore, in the price range [2, 5] the proportion of subjects who buy is 
significantly higher in Beijing than in Shenzhen, meaning that the null hypothesis in H2 is 
rejected for low prices. 
In both treatments, Beijing and Shenzhen, we asked subjects at each price about their 
expectations regarding the share of all other participants they believed would purchase the 
permit at the respective price levels.9 Figure 4 shows that the mean percentage of individual 
expectations in Beijing ( FG*8,	5 ) is constantly above the mean in Shenzhen 
(FG*34,564,5).10 Furthermore, mean expectations decrease with price. 
  
                                                 
9 In treatment Beijing, subjects who faced a second decision situation where not asked about their expectations. 
10 We also asked subjects about their ETS price expectations (see Appendix 3, Table A3_2a). There is no 
significant difference in the ETS price expectations between both regions (MWU test, p-value = 0.733). 
Furthermore, 80% (79%) of subjects in the Beijing (Shenzhen) treatment indicated that they do not know the 
ETS price (see A3_2a in Appendix 3). Due to this observation and the fact that private access to the Chinese 
ETS markets is to our knowledge practically impossible, we can assume that field prices did not affect individual 
purchase decisions in our experiment.   
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Figure 4: Expectations regarding the percentage of other subjects who buy 
 
Table 6 shows the values for FG*8,	5 and FG*34,564,5 together with the p-values of a t-test 
for each price  . For the price range [2, 9] mean expectations in Beijing are significantly 
higher than in Shenzhen at a p-value < 0.05. The price range broadens to [2, 27] if we accept a 
10% level of significance.  
 
Table 6: Expectations regarding the percentage of other subjects who buy 
  FG*8,	5 FG*34,564,5 t-value df p-value 
2 70.61 47.28 -3.09 93.00 0.003 
5 63.89 46.52 -2.49 91.16 0.015 
9 57.02 34.96 -2.93 92.27 0.004 
14 43.72 31.91 -1.71 94.45 0.091 
20 44.57 31.45 -1.83 91.64 0.071 
27 31.50 20.54 -1.93 97.97 0.057 
35 26.98 18.70 -1.47 92.46 0.144 
45 23.06 14.41 -1.77 97.72 0.080 
70 15.48 9.41 -1.58 89.53 0.117 
100 12.30 7.26 -1.53 94.55 0.130 
200 9.26 1.75 -2.92 50.85 0.005 
300 6.24 2.46 -1.59 83.29 0.116 
Note: Two-sided t-test. 
 
5.3 Econometric analysis 
This section presents logit models to estimate treatment and covariate effects on the 
probability to buy the certificate. Therein, the purchase of certificate (yes/no) is the dependent 
variable. Table 7 summarizes the socio-economic covariates of the following models. The 
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covariates contain standard demographic variables such as gender, age, income, and academic 
education. We also include dummy variables for religion and risk preference, membership to 
the communist party as well as for having children below 6 years and between 6 and 18 years. 
Furthermore, commuting time is also included. Additionally, we control for individual 
attitudes towards the environment and climate policies. 39% of respondents are concerned 
about global warming. 75% (18%) are concerned about pollution in the north incl. Beijing 
(south incl. Shenzhen). 22% of respondents agree with the statement “It is pointless to try to 
do something against climate change as an individual.” We use this statement as a proxy for 
dilemma awareness, which measures the degree to which the sample is aware of the social 
dilemma of emissions reductions as dilemma awareness has been found to affect WTP for 
public goods (Liebe et al. 2011, Uehleke and Sturm 2017). We measure the degree of pro-
environmental behavior with the Personal Norm Scale (Stern et al. 1999, Steg et al. 2005, 
Steg et al. 2013) which explains support for pro-environmental action. The question wording 
and the scale properties are given in Appendix 3 (Table A3_3e). Finally, 42% stated that they 
trust that the ETS is fit to reduce CO2 emissions. 
The results for the logit models are presented in Table 8 in which coefficients are presented as 
odds ratios. Model 1 includes only the price   as an explanatory variable. Model 2 adds a 
dummy variable for the Beijing treatment (the reference is Shenzhen in this case). In model 3 
an interaction dummy variable for Beijing and prices in [2, 5] is added. Model 4 adds socio-
economic characteristics and various environmental attitudes. 11  Overall, the logit results 
confirm the univariate results of the treatment influence, meaning that we have to reject the 
null in H2 and in H3 for low prices. For prices in [2, 5], the odds ratio of being in the Beijing 
group over being in the Shenzhen group is 4.25, indicating that the odds of buying a certificate 
are 3.25 times higher in the Beijing group than in Shenzhen group for this price interval, when 
all other variables remain constant.  
 
                                                 
11 Models 5-7 (see Appendix 4) include interaction terms between the Beijing treatment condition and a dummy 
for prices in [2, 14], [2, 27] and [2, 45]. Due to the higher goodness-of-fit measure we focus here on model 4. 
Model 4 is also estimated with a random effects (RE) structure (see Appendix 4, model 4 RE). We refer only to 
the clustered standard errors model here since the model fit for this model is much better than for the random 
effects model (see Figure 5 in Appendix 4).  
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Table 7: Summary of socio-economic covariates 
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
Female 0.64 0.48 0 1 
Age (in years) 41.23 14.63 19 77 
Income (in 1,000 RMB) 6.50 4.87 0.50 25.00 
Academic degree 0.58 0.49 0 1 
Religion 0.09 0.28 0 1 
Risk (in [1,10]) 4.93 2.34 1 10 
Party 0.32 0.47 0 1 
Children between 6 and 18 years 0.08 0.28 0 1 
Children below 6 years 0.18 0.38 0 1 
Commuting time (in hours) 1.36 0.78 0.25 3.25 
Concern for climate change 0.39 0.49 0 1 
Concern pollution (north) 0.75 0.43 0 1 
Concern pollution (south) 0.18 0.39 0 1 
Dilemma awareness 0.22 0.42 0 1 
Personal norm (in [1,4]) 2.99 0.49 1.40 4.00 
Trust in ETS 0.42 0.49 0 1 
 
Furthermore, in model 4 we find evidence for the factors underlying the decision (ceteris-
paribus for p-value < 0.05). First, for individual decisions the price   of the certificate reduces 
the odds of buying by 3% for each additional RMB. Second, increasing individual risk 
attitude has a positive effect on the purchase probability. With each additional point on the 
risk scale the odds of buying increases by 26%. Subjects who trust in the ETS have 1.74 times 
higher odds in making a transaction than subjects who do not trust in the ETS. Furthermore, 
subjects who identified themselves as religious exhibit 1.19 times higher odds than non-
religious subjects of purchasing certificates. Finally, subjects with children aged between 6 
and 18 years have 70% smaller odds of buying than subjects not in this group. 
The results of our regression analysis (model 4) can be supported by literature on the issue. 
The observed effects for price and trust in ETS are qualitatively consistent with similar 
studies executed with EU ETS permits (e.g. Uehleke and Sturm 2017). Meanwhile, the 
empirical evidence regarding the effect of risk attitude on contributions to environmental 
goods is limited. Contrary to our results, Bartczak et al. (2016) find that risk seekers 
contribute less to the local environmental good species protection. Given the literature, the 
insignificance of effects for the variables dilemma awareness and personal norm as well as the 
environmental concern variables is surprising too. The negative effect of having older 
children on the purchase decision might be explained by the fact that those subjects have a 
tighter budget constraints. 
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Table 8: Logit regression 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
P (in RMB) 0.97 (0.01)*** 0.97 (0.01)*** 0.98 (0.01)*** 0.97 (0.01)*** 
Beijing 
 
1.36 (0.32) 
  
BeijingxP.eol.5 
  
3.08 (0.75)*** 4.25 (1.31)*** 
BeijingxP.larger.5 
  
0.97 (0.24) 0.95 (0.28) 
Female 
   
0.79 (0.22) 
Age 
   
0.97 (0.01) 
Income 
   
1.03 (0.03) 
Academic.degree 
   
1.85 (0.79) 
Commuting.time 
   
1.02 (0.15) 
Religion 
   
2.19 (0.83)* 
Risk 
   
1.26 (0.07)*** 
Party 
   
1.36 (0.34) 
Children.between.6.18 
   
0.30 (0.16)* 
Children.below.6 
   
0.90 (0.30) 
Trust.in.ETS 
   
2.74 (0.67)*** 
Dilemma.awareness 
   
0.88 (0.33) 
Personal.norm 
   
0.82 (0.25) 
Concern.climate.change 
   
0.97 (0.26) 
Concern.pollution.north 
   
1.12 (0.35) 
Concern.pollution.south 
   
1.12 (0.40) 
Num. obs. 1902 1902 1902 1543 
Pseudo R2 0.171 0.174 0.195 0.328 
 
Notes: ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05. Purchase of certificate (yes/no) is the dependent variable, coefficients are 
presented as odds ratios, standard errors in parentheses are corrected for clustered observations. “eol.5” = equal or 
lower 5 RMB. 
 
To illustrate the identified effects in Table 9 average marginal effects on the probability to 
buy are presented. For the price range [2, 5] in the Beijing treatment, for example, subjects on 
average have a 16 percentage points higher probability to purchase a certificate than in the 
Shenzhen treatment. 
 
Table 9: Average marginal effects on the probability to buy 
 
H/G JF K  > |K| 
P (in RMB) -0.0031 0.0007 -4.50 0.000 
BeijingxP.eol.5 0.1607 0.0339 4.74 0.000 
Religion 0.0870 0.0415 2.10 0.036 
Risk 0.0260 0.0064 4.09 0.000 
Children.between.6.18 -0.1321 0.0569 -2.32 0.020 
Trust.in.ETS 0.1121 0.0258 4.35 0.000 
 
Notes: Average marginal effects for statistically significant variables in model 4 (see Table 8).  
Standard errors are corrected for clustered observations. 
 
5.4 Elasticity 
Based on the logit estimates presented in Section 5.3 and following the analysis of Diederich 
and Goeschl (2017), we calculate the corresponding average marginal effects and the average 
elasticity of the probability of purchasing with respect to the price (LeClere 1992). The 
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elasticity of the probability of purchasing captures the change in the probability to buy 
certificates caused by a one percent change in price and is calculated as follows 
MN- = OP QR@N
N
OP QR@
  
where S is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 for a contributor and OP QR@N = TF 
is the marginal effect of a price increase on the probability. An elasticity below one (in 
absolute value) then describes a less-than-proportionate change in the probability relative to 
the price  , and vice versa. 
 
Table 10: Average marginal effects and elasticities 
 All observations Beijing Shenzhen 
prices TF M U  TF M U  TF M U  
[2, 14] -0.025** (0.003) 
-0.510** 
(0.084) 
-0.028** 
(0.004) 
-0.572** 
(0.101) 
-0.015* 
(0.006) 
-0.363* 
(0.156) 
[2, 45] -0.011** (0.001) 
-0.895** 
(0.104) 
-0.012** 
(0.001) 
-0.978** 
(0.130) 
-0.008** 
(0.002) 
-0.696** 
(0.168) 
[2, 300] -0.005** (0.001) 
-2.241** 
(0.430) 
-0.006** 
(0.001) 
-2.652** 
(0.557) 
-0.003** 
(0.001) 
-1.473* 
(0.580) 
 
Notes: Average marginal effect of the price on the probability to buy (TF) and average elasticity of the probability of 
contributing (MN-). Specification with price as the only explanatory variable (model 1 in Table 8). Standard errors in 
parentheses are corrected for clustered observations. **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05.  
 
In Table 10 the results are shown for the specification with the price as the only explanatory 
variable.12 For all observations, the absolute effect of the marginal effect (1 unit = 1 RMB) 
decreases across the price range. This is consistent with the purchase behavior depicted in 
Figure 3. A price increase by 1 RMB has a rather strong effect on the probability to buy when 
the price level is low compared to a broader price range including higher prices. For Beijing, 
the marginal effect of a price increase on the probability to buy is stronger than for Shenzhen 
in all price ranges. This observation is also in line with Figure 3 as the proportion of subjects 
who buy is much higher in Beijing than in Shenzhen at low prices while both proportions 
converge quickly to zero as prices increase. 
Across the entire price range, the elasticity is estimated at MN- = −2.24 . A one percent 
increase in price on average leads to a decrease of the purchase probability by 2.24 percent. 
Thus, overall we observe an elastic price reaction. Starting from low prices in the range [2, 
14] the absolute value of the elasticity increases, i.e. the price reaction becomes more elastic. 
This effect is caused by the observed pattern of purchase decisions (see Figure 3). For low 
prices in [2, 14] the probability to buy is in the range of 50%. A 1%-increase of the price 
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causes an inelastic reaction in this case. For high prices the probability to buy quickly reaches 
values near zero. A 1%-increase in the price therefore causes an elastic reaction. As expected 
the absolute value of the elasticity is higher in Beijing than in Shenzhen for all price ranges. 
Overall, the observed elasticity for Beijing is MN- = −2.65 and for Shenzhen MN- = −1.47. 
It is interesting to note that in a similar setting Diederich and Goeschl (2017) report an 
elasticity of MN- = −0.3 across the entire price range for a German sample. It follows from 
this observation, that rising prices will not matter much for the demand for voluntary CO2 
reductions. In contrast to the inelastic price reaction observed in Germany, our subjects in the 
Shenzhen treatment, where only the public good characteristic should matter, exhibit price 
elastic behavior. Obviously, the demand reaction to price increases of a global public good in 
emerging economies such as China is much more price sensitive than in developed countries 
such as Germany. Assuming that prices for CO2 reductions in China will rather increase in the 
future than decrease, our policy conclusion is, therefore, rather pessimistic since then the 
potential of voluntary contributions to CO2 reductions reduces accordingly. 
5.5 Additional WTP estimates 
In order to prove the robustness of the results obtained so far, we present additional WTP 
estimates. To estimate the WTP from dichotomous responses we use the lower-bound 
Turnbull (\]) estimator (see Turnbull 1976, Haab and McConnell 2003) which is a non-
parametric estimation method. The advantage of this approach is that it relies only on the 
respondents’ information, namely that the WTP is at least the presented price if the certificate 
is purchased. The calculation of the \] estimator is explained in Appendix 5. 
 
Table 10: WTP estimates 
WTP in RMB All observations Beijing Shenzhen 
^_E [95% CI] 11.29 [9.60, 12.99] 11.39 [9.51, 13.27] 11.10 [7.55, 14.65] 
^_E [2, 9] [2, 9] [0, 2] 
`. . ^_E  3.51 4.95 1.73 
 
Notes: Non-parametric lower-bound Turnbull (\]) estimator for the willingness to pay in RMB. 
For the method of calculation see Appendix 5. The linearly interpolated median (`. . ^_E) is 
obtained from the corresponding values of the cdf. 
 
The WTP estimates are shown in Table 10 for all observations as well as for both treatments 
Beijing and Shenzhen. The mean WTP for Beijing (11.39 RMB) is only slightly larger than for 
Shenzhen (11.10 RMB) and both confidence intervals clearly overlap. Additionally, due to the 
                                                                                                                                                        
12 See Appendix 4 (Table A4_2) for estimates with price and other covariates in model 4 (Table 8) which are 
very similar to the values presented here. 
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low number of purchases at higher prices, the standard deviation is rather large (see Appendix 
5) and consequently the confidence intervals are rather broad. The median which is robust to 
extreme observations is much lower than the mean in both treatments. The reason for this 
observation is that the mean for both treatments is biased to the right by a few purchases at the 
highest prices above 70 RMB (see Table 5 and Appendix 5). Therefore, we focus on the 
median here. The median is in the price range [2, 9] for Beijing and in [0, 2] for Shenzhen. 
According to the linearly interpolated median in Beijing 50% of the subjects have a WTP of 
4.95 RMB or more while in Shenzhen 50% of the subjects have a WTP of only 1.73 RMB or 
more. Thus, we can state that based on the linearly interpolated median in Beijing 65% of the 
WTP for a certificate is driven by a preference for local co-benefits and 35% by a preference 
for reducing global warming. Obviously, the weights of the preferences for local co-benefits 
on the one hand and global CO2 emissions reduction on the other hand depend on the chosen 
metric (see our calculation in Section 5.2). Based on our results we can conclude, that 
regarding the median WTP the preference for local co-benefits such as the reduction of local 
air pollution seems to be more important than the preference to avoid global warming. 
6 Conclusion 
China, the world’s largest CO2 emitter, has to struggle with severe environmental problems 
such as local air pollution. Due to the link between CO2 emissions and, especially, local air 
pollution it is often suggested that the country has additional private incentives, so called co-
benefits, to contribute to CO2 reduction. In this paper, we present first experimental evidence 
on these co-benefits from climate change mitigation which are observable in real individual 
decisions. For this purpose, we use the fact that in China several sub-national emissions 
trading schemes (ETS) exist which are separate from each other. In our experiment, we sell 
permits from Beijing and Shenzhen ETS to a sample of subjects from Beijing. Both regions, 
Beijing and Shenzhen, are sufficiently far away from each other in order to avoid an increase 
of local pollution levels in Beijing caused by emissions in Shenzhen. Since CO2 emissions are 
inevitably linked to emissions of local air pollutants, our design allows us to separate the 
demand for local environmental protection on the one hand and mitigating anthropogenic 
global warming on the other. Our core result is that Chinese subjects have a positive demand 
for climate change mitigation and – at low prices only – an additional positive demand for 
local environmental protection as the latter generates local co-benefits, e.g., in the form of 
reduced air pollution. The demand reaction to the CO2 price has the expected negative sign 
and is relatively elastic. This elastic price reaction lowers the potential of voluntary CO2 
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reductions under rising prices. Interestingly, subjects expect the observed demand behavior 
regarding price and treatment effect.  
Our results may partly explain China’s active role in recent climate policy: China does not 
only benefit from mitigating climate change, but does so too from the associated local co-
benefits. Two qualifications are in order regarding the policy implications of our results. First, 
since we measure individual demand decisions in a public good context, our individual data 
do not reflect the “true” demand or WTP for the provision of the public good. We can assume 
that the individual demand for the global public good, and thus the WTP, depend on the 
decision of other subjects and on the level of collective action at the national and international 
level. Our results, however, show that even under complete absence of collective action 
Chinese subjects are willing to sacrifice their own money in order to mitigate climate change 
and, additionally, to provide local co-benefits such as reduced air pollution. Secondly, the 
identified value added from local co-benefits seems to be relatively small and is limited to 
small prices only. However, we must also take into account that our design frames reducing 
CO2 emissions as a primary benefit and the reduction of local air pollution as a co-benefit 
only. Interestingly, even under this framing we were able to show a treatment effect. For the 
median WTP the preference for local environmental protection such as the reduction of local 
air pollution is even stronger than the preference for contributing to climate change 
mitigation. It might certainly be the case that the additional demand for local environmental 
protection is much higher when reducing CO2 emissions is treated as the side-benefit and 
effects such as improving local air pollution are listed as the primary benefit. Due to the 
massive local air pollution in Chinese cities, there are good reasons to assume that for Chinese 
subjects the marginal benefit from reducing local air pollution is much higher than from 
mitigating climate change. Thus, the effect identified in our study can be seen as “lower 
bound” for the true treatment effect. 
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Appendix 1: Sampling and Grouping 
 
1. Sampling 
In order to have representative sample of Beijing local residents, the sampling procedure design is 
based on the following facts.  
1) according to the population density distribution data from Beijing Statistical Agency, over 
50% of the total citizens in Beijing live within the 5th ring road, in the six districts namely 
Dongcheng, Xicheng, Chaoyang, Haidian, Fengtai and Shijingshan. 
2) the neighborhood committee (jvweihui, introduction can be found in this Appendix below) 
was used as the targeted spot and communication hub. There are 1,500 neighborhood 
committees within the total sample, consisting of over 330 thousand households (details about 
each committee are purchased from a consulting company).  
3) In order to minimize the cost, we use the clustering method to send invitations: a. randomly 
select 100 neighborhood committees (controlling for size); b. for each neighborhood 
committee, choose randomly of the building and the corridor (adjusted for size); c. for chosen 
corridor, send invitation letters one household by another (i.e., survey-type in the last step). 
4) before the formal delivery, the research team carried a trial delivery of 100 invitations in the 
randomly selected neighborhood committees, and got 3 feedbacks, which indicated the 
appropriate feedback rate was about 3%. In order that we get enough respondents (say, 200-
300) and taking into account relatively low feedback rate, 8,000 households are selected.13 
 
2. Grouping  
After a 6-day delivery of 8,000 invitation letters, and a careful selection of the participants, we got 317 
registered subjects for our eleven sessions (see Invitation letter and the timetable of sessions in next 
section of this Appendix), with 64% of female and average age of 41 years-old (and the median is 36 
years-old). The average size of each session is 28. 
 
Invitation letter 
For randomly chosen household in the municipal area of Beijing 
Subject: Invitation to a scientific study with payment 
 
Dear Madam/Sir, 
University of International Business and Economics (UIBE) in Beijing is a top-ranking University in 
China, which carries out research activities such as applied economic research. At the moment, UIBE 
is conducting a scientific study for which we are looking for participants. For this purpose we want to 
invite you.  
For the participation in a study, which takes approximately 60-90 minutes, you get paid out 300 RMB 
in cash. Within the study you have the opportunity to make buying decisions. For the buying decision 
rules are in force, which are established by the staff of the UIBE as well as the group of participants. 
You can take home – depending on your buying decisions as well as the buying decisions of the other 
participants – up to 300 RMB. Only the team of scientists get to know your identity, whereas your data 
are treated strictly confidential and in compliance with the data privacy act. Money amount, which you 
possibly paid for your purchase, are paid at the end of the study.  
Please take into consideration the following prerequisites for taking part in the study: 
- Enrollment by phone or email, 
- Residence in Beijing (Proof, e.g. ID), 
- Native Chinese, 
- Age between 18 and 75, 
                                                 
13 Dr. Fred Engst and Dr. Hongyu Pan are gratefully acknowledged for their help with the developing of the 
sampling method. Thanks also go to Wenzhan Li, Yongjie Liu, Jiatong Jiang, Zhuqi Shen, Linshu Wang, Shuai 
Wang, and Jiawei Zhang for their dedicated work sending out the invitation letters, receiving phone calls/emails 
and related assistance. Further, we use the Wechat as a dissemination tool to call for more participants, and 1/4 
to 1/3 subjects are enrolled through this channel. 
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- On time appearance at the chosen appointment and present this letter and your ID. 
For the case that you want to take part in this study and you fulfill the above-named prerequisites, we 
ask you to choose one of the appointments on the back page and to enroll by phone. It is also possible 
to contact us by using the email address GLCE@uibe.edu.cn. Afterwards, we get in touch with you. 
The selection of the participants is according to scientific criteria. The study is conducted at the UIBE 
in Beijing. We are available for further questions by calling the phone number 010-64494361 between 
Feb. 17 and Feb. 25, 2017 (Monday to Friday from 13:00-17:00) as well as by email. 
We would be pleased to welcome you to our study. 
Yours truly, 
 
Appointment (Weekday/Weekends, date, time) 
  Morning Afternoon Evening 
11 March (Sat.) 10:00-11:30 1:00-2:30 3:00-4:30 6:00-7:30 
12 March (Sun.) 10:00-11:30 1:00-2:30 3:00-4:30 6:00-7:30 
13 March (Mon.) 10:00-11:30 
 
3:00-4:30 
 
 
Enrollment: 
Please call the number 010-64494361 between 1:00 and 5:00 pm during the weekdays from Feb. 17 to 
Feb. 25, 2017 (Monday to Friday) or enroll via sending email to the address GLCE@uibe.edu.cn. 
Please name an appointment (see above) at which you want take part at the study. Your name is 
written down during the enrollment process – however, as stated above it is not published or passed on 
a third party. Please note that you cannot claim to participate at the study by with the receipt of this 
letter. The selection of the participants is according to scientific criteria. 
 
The location of UIBE 
 
 
UIBE locates between 3rd and 4th Ring in Northeast Beijing, with China Daily to its west, China-Japan 
Friendship Hospital to its south, Sinopec to its north, and Shaoyaoju to its east. Many bus lines pass 
the west gate of UIBE, such as line 62, line 409, line 807, line 422, line 847, line 406, line 713, line 
419, line 361, line 18, and line 379, among others. Alternatively, one can take subway line 5 or line 10 
and get off at Huixinxijie Nankou Station, and using the exit B or C and another 15min walking to 
UIBE; or line 10 or line 13 and get off at Shaoyaoju Station, and taking exit B or A, then 10min 
walking to UIBE. 
 
Information about UIBE 
The University of International Business and Economics (UIBE), founded in 1951, is a multi-
disciplinary and national key university with economics, management, law, literature and science as its 
core academic areas of expertise. Since its foundation, UIBE has been steadfast in living up to its 
motto of “Erudition, Honesty, Endeavor and Perfection” through constant diligence and innovation. 
At present, UIBE consists of 15 academic schools, a Graduate School, a Department of Physical 
Education and a Department of Culture and Art, offering over 1405 undergraduate courses, 875 
postgraduate courses, and 109 doctoral courses. 
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UIBE plays a leading role in the development of international alliance with universities around the 
world. Currently, UIBE has established partnerships with over 160 overseas universities and 
international organizations. You will find additional information about UIBE on our homepage 
http://www.uibe.edu.cn. 
 
Introduction of Juweihui 
The neighborhood committees or the resident committees — aka juweihui（居委会） — arose as 
"autonomous urban grassroots civil organizations" in the 1950s. The first neighborhood committees 
were found in the urban area and then in rural area of China in 1980s. Juweihui are the lowest level of 
government in charge of civil affairs. They help the government to enforce such policies as family 
planning, mobile population management, crime prevention and census administration.  
Nowadays, juweihui also undertake tasks such as organizing free hobby classes; coordinating 
secondhand exchange markets; removing illegal advertisements; ensuring sanitation; and organizing 
volunteers to care for the elderly and those living with physical or mental disabilities. One of their 
important responsibilities is to distribute social security and welfare to low-income households, people 
with disabilities and the unemployed.  
Normally, each juweihui is responsible for 100-700 families in the neighborhood. There are 2,932 
juweihui in Beijing, according to the data released in 2015. 
 
Letter of understanding 
Thanks for your support and participation in the research conducted by the University of International 
Business and Economics, which is funded by the National Natural Science Foundation of China and 
other research grants. Please read the following carefully before you participate in the study. If you 
have any questions, please contact our staff. 
The study lasts about 1-1.5 hours. During the course of the study, you will need to complete the survey 
questionnaire and make a voluntary decision based on the rule setting out in the research. Our findings 
will be based on your consumer decision and final payment behavior. Throughout the research 
process, all your decisions are made on a voluntary basis. Your personal information and decision data 
will be kept strictly confidential. 
We will provide 300 RMB of research subsidies for the related expenses such as the transportation 
expenses you are involved in. 
Thanks again for your support and participation! 
 
I have read this letter and have understood the terms of the study, and I voluntarily participate in the 
study regarding consumer decision making and will complete the questionnaire. 
 
Signature of the participant:  University of International Business and Economics  
Date:        
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Appendix 2: Instructions and questionnaires 
Welcome at UIBE! 
We are looking forward to your participation in our survey. Your opinion and personal assessment of a 
number of issues in consumption behavior is very important for us. Thank you in advance for your 
cooperation. 
In this document you find all necessary information for the event. During the event you can go back in 
the document at any time.  
Do not go ahead when you see the STOP sign! Please turn over this page only when we tell you to do 
so. Please read the instructions carefully. Do not talk to other participants. 
We promise that your individual information is treated confidential. 
 
Questionnaire I 
Please answer to the following questions. 
 
(If necessary variables and/or numeric codes are marked.) 
 
A01  
Taking all things together, how happy are you these days? Please tick a box on the scale, where the 
value 1 means: ‘not at all happy’ and the value 10 means: ‘very happy’. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
 
A02  
All in all, how would you describe your state of health these days? Please tick a box on the scale, 
where the value 1 means: ‘poor’ and the value 10 means: ‘very good’. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
 
A03  
All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days? Please tick a box on 
the scale, where the value 1 means: ‘completely dissatisfied’ and the value 10 means: ‘completely 
satisfied’. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
 
A04 
Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do you try to avoid taking risks? 
Please tick a box on the scale, where the value 1 means: ‘unwilling to take risks’ and the value 10 
means: ‘fully prepared to take risks’. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
 
A05 
Are you generally concerned about human-induced climate change? 
Not concerned  
1 
Rather not 
concerned 2 
Rather concerned  
3 
Concerned  
4 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
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A06 
Are you generally concerned about local air pollution caused by pollutants like for example particulate 
matter (PM2.5 and PM10), sulfur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide or ozone? 
 
 
 
 
 
Please tick a box for the scale of 
your concern about local air 
pollution in the two selected 
regions displayed in the map. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Not concerned  
1 
Rather not 
concerned 2 
Rather 
concerned 3 
Concerned  
4 
North (incl. Beijing) A06_01 ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
South (incl. Shenzhen) 
A06_02 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
 
A07 
How would you describe your knowledge about the following topics? 
 Poorly 
informed 1 
Rather poorly 
informed 2 
Rather well 
informed 3 
Well informed  
4 
Regarding climate change  
I am … A07_01 ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
Regarding emissions trading  
I am … A07_02 ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
Regarding local air pollution  
I am … A07_03 ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
 
  
North (incl. Beijing) 
South (incl. Shenzhen) 
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General information 
Today, we will offer you a certain product to purchase. In a few minutes you will learn which product 
it is and how the sale will be conducted. 
As we want to assess whether you want to purchase the product, we would like to ask you not to talk 
to the other participants. 
If you have any questions please do not hesitate to contact us. 
 
Rules of purchase 
No one except for the UIBE team will learn about your statements from the event. 
The process of sale can be explained in three steps: 
 
i) Introduction of the product 
Before we ask you to make a purchase decision, we will briefly introduce the product to you. 
 
ii) Decision to buy for different prices 
You will receive different prices for one unit of the product. For each price you can indicate whether 
you are willing to buy or not (there is no obligation to buy).  
 
iii) Payment 
After the decision and after the second questionnaire, one price is randomly selected and the 
transaction is realized. Please note: If you purchase the product, you will have to use your own 
money. 
In a moment, we will go over a quick example with you. 
 
Please note: 
With these rules of purchase it is in your own interest to purchase the product only in case you 
actually want to buy at the respective price.  
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Comprehension Test 
We will now carry out a short test to check whether you have fully understood the rules of purchase. 
Please let us know, when you have finished answering all questions (i.e. ticked the corresponding box) 
and we will come to you. 
Imagine a participant is willing to pay up to 70 RMB for the product. He has to decide whether to 
purchase or not the product for the following six prices. After the decisions one price is randomly 
selected and the transaction is realized for this price. Please indicate in the table below how the 
participant should decide in situation 1 below. 
 
Situation 1 Purchase 
# Price (in RMB) YES NO 
1 100 ⃝ ⃝ 
2   80 ⃝ ⃝ 
3   60 ⃝ ⃝ 
4   40 ⃝ ⃝ 
5   20 ⃝ ⃝ 
6   10 ⃝ ⃝ 
 
Now assume, a participant is willing to pay up to 30 RMB for the product. Please indicate how the 
participant should decide in situation 2 below. 
 
Situation 2 Purchase 
# Price (in RMB) YES NO 
1 100 ⃝ ⃝ 
2   80 ⃝ ⃝ 
3   60 ⃝ ⃝ 
4   40 ⃝ ⃝ 
5   20 ⃝ ⃝ 
6   10 ⃝ ⃝ 
 
Please answer the following questions: 
 
1. What should I do in case I do not want buy the product at all? 
⃝ I indicate “Yes” for all prices. 
⃝ I indicate “No” for all prices. 
⃝ I only indicate “Yes” for the price 10 RMB. 
 
2. How many prices will be randomly selected in each situation? 
⃝ 2 prices 
⃝   5 prices 
⃝   1 price 
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Information on Climate Change 
Please read the information provided on this page carefully. 
You have about 10 minutes to do so. 
 
Global climate change is seen as a serious environmental problem faced by mankind. Human influence 
on the climate system is clear: mankind largely contributes to climate change by emitting greenhouse 
gases, especially carbon dioxide (CO2). CO2 originates mainly from burning of fossil fuels like coal, 
oil or natural gas in industrial processes and energy production, or combustion engines of cars and 
lorries. CO2 is a global pollutant, i.e. each quantity unit of CO2 emitted has the same effect on the 
climate regardless of the location where the emission has occurred. Fossil fuel and biofuel combustion 
is also a very important man-made source of air pollutants like particulate matter (PM2.5 and PM10), 
sulfur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide or ozone with more localized effects.  
 
Without additional efforts to reduce greenhouse gases emissions beyond those in place today, global 
mean surface temperature is expected to increase in 2100 in the range from 3.7°C to 4.8°C above the 
pre-industrial average.  
 
There are several consequences from rising temperatures. The most important consequences are stated 
below: 
1. Extreme weather events like extreme heat waves, strong rainfalls and tropical storms are likely 
to become more frequent. Higher damages due to extreme weather events are expected.  
2. The oceans will continue to warm and acidify, and global mean sea level to rise. For the period 
2081–2100 relative to 1986–2005, the rise will likely be in the ranges of 0.26 to 0.82 m. Thus, low 
lying coastal regions may be threatened by floods. Sea level rise will not be uniform across 
regions. 
3. The consequences of climate change will vary regionally resulting in substantial consequences 
for example in agriculture. Countries in the south which today are already hot and dry will become 
even hotter and dryer. Especially African countries will have to expect lower crop yields.  
4. In China the following effects can be expected: The agricultural system may become more 
vulnerable and food security will be threatened. Coastal cities such as Guangzhou, Shanghai, and 
Tianjin will face the threat of flooding.  
 
In order to mitigate climate change, reducing CO2 emissions is necessary. Abatement of CO2 is 
costly. Reducing CO2 emissions, however, can be associated with significant co-benefits from reduced 
emissions of local air pollutants and related human health and ecosystem impacts.  
 
Sources used:  
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 2014, AR5) 
World Energy Outlook, Energy and Air Pollution (2016) 
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Information on Beijing Emissions Trading System (Note: in treatment Beijing) 
Please read the information provided on this page carefully. 
You will have about 10 minutes to do so. 
 
In 2013 Beijing, together with six pilot provinces/cities (Shanghai, Tianjin, Chongqing, Shenzhen, 
Guangdong and Hubei), has implemented the emissions trading system (ETS) for carbon dioxide 
(CO2). Emissions trading is one of the instruments of climate policy in China. It follows a simple 
principle: National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), jointly with Beijing (and other 
pilot cities), has determined the amount of CO2 to be emitted altogether in the respective sectors 
(energy production and energy intensive industries). This total amount will be distributed to the 
companies in the form of emission rights (“certificates” or “permits”). For each quantity unit of CO2 
emitted, the company has to give a certificate to the ETS. The certificates can be traded between 
companies.  
 
For each quantity unit of CO2 emitted e.g. by a power plant, the plant operator has to prove his 
permission to do so in the form of a certificate. This leads to an important consequence: If the total 
amount of certificates is reduced, the total emissions will be lower, simply because plant operators 
do not possess enough emission allowances. That means if a certificate for one quantity unit is 
obtained from the market and is being “retired” (i.e. deleted) the total CO2 emissions are reduced 
by exactly this quantity amount. The opportunity to retire certificates actually exists in the 
framework of the Emissions Trading System of Beijing. The NDRC regulates emissions trading and 
holds a retirement account. If certificates are transferred to this account they will be withdrawn from 
circulation, i.e. deleted, by the end of each year and can no longer be used by the companies.  
 
Emissions trading has one central advantage: It guarantees that the abatement of CO2 emissions occurs 
where it is the cheapest. Companies with opportunities to abate carbon dioxide at lower costs will do 
so and sell their certificates on the market, whereas companies with high abatement costs can acquire 
certificates at a relatively low price. This trade is beneficiary for both sides and guarantees for the 
emission reduction target to be achieved at minimal costs. The abatement of CO2 emissions in the 
Beijing emissions trading system is likely to deliver also local air quality improvements as facilities 
become more energy efficient or switch to cleaner fuels.  
 
Altogether, Beijing energy producers and energy intensive industries were allowed to emit about 45 
million tons of CO2 in the year 2014. As a benchmark: global / China CO2 emissions per year amount 
for 32.000 / 9.000 million tons of CO2. 
 
Summarising, it can be stated that if the total amount of certificates in the Beijing Emissions Trading 
System is reduced, the total CO2 emissions in Beijing decrease affecting also local air pollution. 
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Purchase of CO2 Certificates (Note: in treatment Beijing, high price vector) 
You are given the opportunity to reduce one ton of CO2 emissions in Beijing by buying one 
certificate of the Beijing Emissions Trading System at this event. Thus, you have the opportunity to 
contribute to the reduction of the actual CO2 emissions in Beijing. 
 
The total amount of certificates purchased will be published on the UIBE website (no names or 
individual purchases will be published). UIBE will buy the amount of certificates chosen and will 
retire them. 
 
The product is 1 ton of CO2. 
 
In the table below you see 6 prices for one CO2 certificate in Beijing. Please indicate for 
each price whether you are willing to buy or not. After the decisions and after the second 
questionnaire, one price is randomly selected and the transaction is realized, i.e. one ton of 
CO2 in Beijing is deleted. 
 
Important note: 
There is no obligation to buy! Certificates purchased by you have to be paid! 
 
 
 
Purchase buy 
# 
Pnumber 
Price (in RMB)  
P 
YES  
1 
NO  
0 
1 300 ⃝ ⃝ 
2 100 ⃝ ⃝ 
3 45 ⃝ ⃝ 
4 27 ⃝ ⃝ 
5 14 ⃝ ⃝ 
6 5 ⃝ ⃝ 
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Questionnaire II (Note: in treatment Beijing, high price vector) 
Please answer the following questions. 
 
B00 
We would like to know what you expect regarding the purchase decision of all other subjects in the 
room. Please indicate the expected proportion of all other subjects who purchase at the given price. 
Example: If all other subjects purchase at a given prices, this makes 100%. If the half of all other 
subject purchase at a given price, this makes 50%. 
 
# Price (in RMB) Purchase of all other participants (in %) 
1 300  
2 100  
3 45  
4 27  
5 14  
6 5  
 
B01 
What do you think is the recent price for CO2 certificates in the Beijing emissions trading scheme? 
RMB I don’t know 
___ ⃝ 
 
B02 
Please indicate how sure you are regarding your price estimate above? 
Not sure  
1 
Rather unsure  
2 
Rather sure  
3 
Sure  
4 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
 
B03 
Do you trust in the ability of the Beijing emissions trading scheme to limit CO2 emissions? 
Not at all  
1 
I rather do  
not trust 2 
I rather trust  
3 
I trust  
4 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
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C01 
Please indicate how you most commonly commute within the city? 
Driving alone with vehicle 1 ⃝ 
Carpooling/carsharing 2 ⃝ 
Driving with motorcycle 3 ⃝ 
Driving with electric bicycle 4 ⃝ 
Park and ride 5 ⃝ 
Public transport 6 ⃝ 
Taxi 7 ⃝ 
Cycling 8 ⃝ 
Walking 9 ⃝ 
  
C02 
Please indicate how many hours per day do you spend commuting in Beijing (round trip)? 
< 0.5 hours 0.25 ⃝ 
0.5-1 0.75 ⃝ 
1-1.5 1.25 ⃝ 
1.5-2 1.75 ⃝ 
2-2.5 2.25 ⃝ 
2.5-3 2.75 ⃝ 
> 3 3.25 ⃝ 
 
C03 
Are you generally satisfied with the environmental conditions in Beijing? 
Not satisfied 1 Rather not satisfied 2 Rather satisfied 3 Satisfied 4 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
 
C04 
Are you a member of an environmental organization or are you regularly engaged in activities 
protecting or enhancing the environment? 
No 0 Yes 1 
⃝ ⃝ 
 
C05 
Please indicate to what extent do you agree to the following statements regarding your personal 
responsibility for climate change: 
 Strongly 
Disagree 1 
Disagree  
2 
Agree  
3 
Strongly 
Agree 4 
It is pointless if I do something against 
climate change as an individual 
C05_01 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
I don’t buy fruits and vegetables from 
far away to save emissions C05_02 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
I feel obliged to consider the climate 
impact of my daily activities C05_03 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
I feel better when I save emissions 
C05_04 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
I have a bad conscience when I drive a 
car instead of using public transport 
C05_05 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
In my daily activities I try to save as 
many emissions as I can C05_06 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
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D01  
Please indicate your gender. 
Female 1 ⃝ 
Male 0 ⃝ 
 
D02 
Please indicate your marital status. 
Single 1 Divorced 2 Married 3 Widow/er 4 Separated 5 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
 
D03 
Please indicate your year of birth. 
 
 
D04 
Please indicate your current living/home address in Beijing (district, street) 
 
 
D05 
Please indicate your highest education level attained. 
Not educated 1 ⃝ 
Elementary 2 ⃝ 
Junior High School 3 ⃝ 
Senior High School 4 ⃝ 
Vocational High School 5 ⃝ 
College 6 ⃝ 
University (Bachelor) 7 ⃝ 
University (Master) 8 ⃝ 
University (Doctorate) 9 ⃝ 
Adult Education, Open University, Evening school 10 ⃝ 
Other(s): Please specify 11  
 
D06 
Please indicate which category best describes your current labor or schooling situation? 
Working 1 ⃝ 
Job searching 2 ⃝ 
Attending school 3 ⃝ 
Housekeeping 4 ⃝ 
Retired 5 ⃝ 
Sick/disable 6 ⃝ 
On vacation/just graduated 7 ⃝ 
Other(s): Please specify 8  
 
D07 
If it is the case that you work: Please indicate which category best describes your current occupation?  
Employed (whole time) 1 ⃝ 
Employed (part time) 2 ⃝ 
Self-employed 3 ⃝ 
Government worker 4 ⃝ 
Casual worker 5 ⃝ 
Other(s): Please specify 6  
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D08 
Please indicate your current working/studying address in Beijing (district, street) 
 
 
D09 
Please indicate how many children (younger than 18 years) live in your household?  
 
 
D10 
Please indicate how many young children (under 6 years old) live in your household?  
 
 
D11 
Are you a member of communist party of China? 
No 0 Yes 1 
⃝ ⃝ 
 
D12 
What is your religion? 
Buddhist 1 ⃝ 
Taoist 2 ⃝ 
Christian 3 ⃝ 
Catholic 4 ⃝ 
Islam 5 ⃝ 
None 6 ⃝ 
Other(s): Please specify 7  
 
D13 
Please indicate your average monthly wage after taxes. 
Less than 1000 RMB 0.5 ⃝ 
1000 to less than 2000 RMB 1.5 ⃝ 
2000 to less than 4000 RMB 3 ⃝ 
4000 to less than 6000 RMB 5 ⃝ 
6000 to less than 8000 RMB 7 ⃝ 
8000 to less than 10000 RMB 9 ⃝ 
10000 to less than 20000 RMB 15 ⃝ 
More than 20000 RMB 25 ⃝ 
Don’t know nA ⃝ 
 
D14 
Please indicate your average monthly household income after taxes (including wages, interests, 
dividends, real estate income, rent/lease/profit sharing of household assets, retirement pension, 
scholarship and insurance money) 
Less than 1000 RMB 0.5 ⃝ 
1000 to less than 2000 RMB 1.5 ⃝ 
2000 to less than 4000 RMB 3 ⃝ 
4000 to less than 6000 RMB 5 ⃝ 
6000 to less than 8000 RMB 7 ⃝ 
8000 to less than 10000 RMB 9 ⃝ 
10000 to less than 20000 RMB 15 ⃝ 
More than 20000 RMB 25 ⃝ 
Don’t know nA ⃝ 
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Leaving the room 
Please leave the room only after we invite you to do so. Please take the instructions with you and hand 
them out to the research assistant who will take care of you at the exit. 
We will randomly select one price before you are leaving the room and you will pay for your purchase 
decision outside the room in case you decided to purchase at the selected price. 
Thank you for your participation! 
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Appendix 3: Descriptive analysis of questionnaire data 
The total number of observations is n = 317. 
 
Table A3_1a: Questionnaire A before the decision 
Description Mean Std.Dev. Missing 
A01: Taking all things together, how happy are you these days? Please 
tick a box on the scale, where the value 1 means: 'not at all happy' and 
the value 10 means: 'very happy'. 
7.74 1.72 0 
A02: All in all, how would you describe your state of health these days? 
Please tick a box on the scale, where the value 1 means: 'poor' and the 
value 10 means: 'very good'. 
7.44 1.69 1 
A03: All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a 
whole these days? Please tick a box on the scale, where the value 1 
means: 'completely dissatisfied' and the value 10 means: 'completely 
satisfied'. 
7.19 1.80 0 
A04: Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do 
you try to avoid taking risks? Please tick a box on the scale, where the 
value 1 means: 'unwilling to take risks' and the value 10 means: 'fully 
prepared to take risks'. 
 
4.95 2.34 1 
Table A3_1b: Questionnaire A before the decision (1 = Not concerned, 2 = Rather not concerned,  
3 = Rather concerned, 4 = Concerned) 
Description Mean Std.Dev. Missing 
A05: Are you generally concerned about human-induced climate 
change? 
3.31 0.63 0 
A06_01: Are you generally concerned about local air pollution in the 
north (incl. Beijing) caused by pollutants like for example particulate 
matter (PM2.5 and PM10), sulfur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide or ozone? 
3.74 0.47 0 
A06_02: Are you generally concerned about local air pollution in the 
south (incl. Shenzhen) caused by pollutants like for example particulate 
matter (PM2.5 and PM10), sulfur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide or ozone? 
 
2.38 1.00 15 
Table A3_1c: Questionnaire A before the decision (1 = Poorly informed, 2 = Rather poorly informed,  
3 = Rather well informed, 4 = Well informed) 
Description Mean Std.Dev. Missing 
A07_01: How would you describe your knowledge about the following 
topics? Regarding climate change I am... 
2.66 0.67 2 
A07_02: How would you describe your knowledge about the following 
topics? Regarding emissions trading I am... 
2.02 0.76 2 
A07_03: How would you describe your knowledge about the following 
topics? Regarding local air pollution I am... 
 
2.61 0.70 0 
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Table A3_2a: Questionnaire B after the decision 
Description Min Q1 Median Mean Q3 Max Std.Dev. 
I don't 
know/Missing 
B01 Beijing: What do 
you think is the recent 
price (in RMB) for 
CO2 certificates in 
the Beijing emissions 
trading scheme? n = 
222 
2 23.75 100 5093.24 300 100000 21020.73 178 
B01 Shenzhen: What 
do you think is the 
recent price (in RMB) 
for CO2 certificates 
in the Shenzhen 
emissions trading 
scheme?, n = 95 
 
5 35.00 85 195.48 200 2000 432.68 75 
Table A3_2b: Questionnaire B after the decision (answers for Beijing and Shenzhen are pooled). 1 = Not 
sure, 2 = Rather unsure, 3 = Rather sure, 4 = Sure 
Description Mean Std.Dev. Missing 
B02: Please indicate how sure you are regarding your price estimate 
above. 
 
1.67 1.02 16 
Table A3_2c: Questionnaire B after the decision (answers for Beijing and Shenzhen are pooled). 1 = Not at 
all, 2 = I rather do not trust, 3 = I rather trust, 4 = I trust) 
Description Mean Std.Dev. Missing 
B03: Do you trust in the ability of the Beijing/Shenzhen emissions 
trading scheme to limit CO2 emissions? 
 
2.37 0.94 0 
Table A3_3a: Questionnaire C after the decision (C01: Please indicate how you most commonly commute 
within the city?) 
Category Proportion 
Driving alone with vehicle 0.101 
Carpooling/carsharing 0.000 
Driving with motorcycle 0.009 
Driving with electric bicycle 0.028 
Park and ride 0.019 
Public transport 0.644 
Taxi 0.000 
Cycling 0.129 
Walking 0.069 
Missing 
 
0.000 
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Table A3_3b: Questionnaire C after the decision (C02: Please indicate how many hours per day do you 
spend commuting in Beijing (round trip)?) 
Category Proportion 
[0, 0.5) 0.110 
[0.5, 1) 0.287 
[1, 1.5) 0.221 
[1.5, 2) 0.164 
[1, 2.5) 0.126 
[2.5, 3) 0.050 
>=3 0.038 
Missing 
 
0.003 
Table A3_3c: Questionnaire C after the decision. 1 = Not satisfied, 2 = Rather not satisfied,  
3 = Rather satisfied, 4 = Satisfied 
Description Mean Std.Dev. Missing 
C03: Are you generally satisfied with the environmental conditions in 
Beijing? 
 
1.82 0.72 0 
Table A3_3d: Questionnaire C after the decision. 1 = Yes, 0 = No 
Description Mean Std.Dev. Missing 
C04: Are you a member of an environmental organization or are you 
regularly engaged in activities protecting or enhancing the environment? 
 
0.24 0.43 1 
Table A3_3e: Questionnaire C after the decision (C05: Please indicate to what extent do you agree to the 
following statements regarding your personal responsibility for climate change. 1 = Strongly Disagree,  
2 = Disagree, 3 = Agree, 4 = Strongly agree) 
Description Mean Std.Dev. Missing 
C05_01: It is pointless if I do something against climate change as an 
individual. 
1.82 0.89 0 
C05_02: I don't buy fruits and vegetables from far away to save 
emissions. 
2.23 0.88 3 
C05_03: I feel obliged to consider the climate impact of my daily 
activities. 
3.43 0.68 2 
C05_04: I feel better when I save emissions. 3.47 0.63 1 
C05_05: I have a bad conscience when I drive a car instead of using 
public transport. 
2.31 0.91 1 
C05_06: In my daily activities I try to save as many emissions as I can. 3.54 0.63 0 
Personal Norm Scale = Personal.norm = Sum of the values for the last 5 
questions above divided by 5 
2.94 0.45 81 
 
Table A3_4a: Questionnaire D after the decision 
Description Mean Std.Dev. Missing 
D01: Please indicate your gender. 1 = Female, 0 = Male 
 
0.64 0.48 0 
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Table A3_4b: Questionnaire D after the decision (D02: Please indicate your marital status.) 
Category Proportion 
Single 0.303 
Divorced 0.025 
Married 0.656 
Widow/er 0.009 
Separated 0.006 
Missing 
 
0.000 
Table A3_4c: Questionnaire D after the decision 
Description Min Q1 Median Mean Q3 Max Std.Dev. Missing 
D03: Please indicate your year 
of birth 
1940 1962 1981 1975.77 1989 1998 14.64 2 
Age 
 
19 28 36 41.23 55 74 14.64 2 
Table A3_4d: Questionnaire D after the decision (D05: Please indicate your highest education level 
attained.) 
Category Proportion 
Not educated 0.000 
Elementary 0.006 
Junior High School 0.076 
Senior High School 0.126 
Vocational High School 0.022 
College 0.158 
University (Bachelor) 0.397 
University (Master) 0.174 
University (Doctorate) 0.013 
Adult Education, Open University, Evening school 0.028 
Other 0.000 
Missing 
 
0.000 
Table A3_4e: Questionnaire D after the decision (D06: Please indicate which category best describes your 
current labor or schooling situation.) 
Category Proportion 
Working 0.653 
Job searching 0.013 
Attending school 0.054 
Housekeeping 0.013 
Retired 0.259 
Sick/disable 0.006 
On vacation/just graduated 0.000 
Other 0.000 
Missing 
 
0.003 
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Table A3_4f: Questionnaire D after the decision (D07: If it is the case that you work: Please indicate 
which category best describes your current occupation?) 
Category Proportion 
Employed (whole time) 0.612 
Employed (part time) 0.035 
Self-employed 0.019 
Government worker 0.032 
Casual worker 0.054 
Other 0.009 
Missing 
 
0.240 
Table A3_4g: Questionnaire D after the decision 
Description Min Q1 Median Mean Q3 Max Std.Dev. Missing 
D09: Please indicate how many 
children (younger than 18 years) live 
in your household? 
0 0 0 0.29 1 2 0.49 9 
D10: Please indicate how many 
children (younger than 6 years) live in 
your household? 
 
0 0 0 0.19 0 2 0.43 9 
Table A3_4h: Questionnaire D after the decision 
Description Mean Std.Dev. Missing 
D11: Are you a member of communist party of China? 1 = Yes, 0 = No 
 
0.32 0.47 0 
Table A3_4i: Questionnaire D after the decision (D12: What is your religion?) 
Category Proportion 
Buddhist 0.063 
Taoist 0.003 
Christian 0.006 
Catholic 0.006 
Islam 0.003 
None 0.861 
Other 0.000 
Missing 
 
0.057 
Table A3_4j: Questionnaire D after the decision (D13: Please indicate your average monthly wage after 
taxes.) 
Category Proportion 
[0, 1000) 0.019 
[1000, 2000) 0.054 
[2000, 4000) 0.287 
[4000, 6000) 0.199 
[6000, 8000) 0.132 
[8000, 10000) 0.117 
[10000, 20000) 0.110 
> 20000 0.022 
Missing 0.054 
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Table A3_4k: Questionnaire D after the decision (D14: Please indicate your average monthly household 
Income after taxes (including wages, interests, dividends, real estate income, rent/lease/profit sharing of 
household assets, retirement pension, scholarship and insurance money)) 
Category Proportion 
[0, 1000) 0.000 
[1000, 2000) 0.013 
[2000, 4000) 0.088 
[4000, 6000) 0.104 
[6000, 8000) 0.148 
[8000, 10000) 0.120 
[10000, 20000) 0.240 
> 20000 0.196 
Missing 0.082 
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Appendix 4: Additional econometric models and estimates 
 
Table A4_1: Logistic regression for treatment effects (Beijing vs. Shenzhen) 
 
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 4 RE 
P 0.97 (0.01)*** 0.97 (0.01)** 0.96 (0.01)*** 0.95 (0.01)*** 
BeijingxP.eol.5    13.12 (7.26)*** 
BeijingxP.larger.5    0.91 (0.45) 
BeijingxP.eol.14 2.28 (0.65)** 
  
 
BeijingxP.larger.14 0.83 (0.28) 
  
 
BeijingxP.eol.27  1.71 (0.47)   
BeijingxP.larger.27  0.79 (0.35)   
BeijingxP.eol.45   1.41 (0.38)  
BeijingxP.larger.45   1.86 (1.46)  
Female 0.79 (0.21) 0.80 (0.21) 0.80 (0.21) 0.73 (0.35) 
Age 0.97 (0.01) 0.97 (0.01) 0.97 (0.01) 0.95 (0.02)* 
Income 1.03 (0.03) 1.03 (0.03) 1.03 (0.03) 1.06 (0.05) 
Academic.degree 1.82 (0.74) 1.78 (0.71) 1.74 (0.70) 2.86 (1.85) 
Commuting.time 1.02 (0.15) 1.02 (0.14) 1.01 (0.14) 1.07 (0.32) 
Religion 2.18 (0.80)* 2.17 (0.79)* 2.17 (0.80)* 4.21 (3.41) 
Risk 1.25 (0.07)*** 1.25 (0.07)*** 1.25 (0.07)*** 1.47 (0.16)** 
Party 1.35 (0.33) 1.34 (0.32) 1.33 (0.32) 1.71 (0.78) 
Kids.between.6.18 0.32 (0.16)* 0.33 (0.16)* 0.33 (0.16)* 0.11 (0.10)** 
Kids.below.6 0.91 (0.29) 0.91 (0.29) 0.91 (0.29) 0.94 (0.53) 
Trust.in.ETS 2.68 (0.64)*** 2.63 (0.62)*** 2.61 (0.60)*** 7.52 (3.72)*** 
Dilemma.awareness 0.88 (0.31) 0.89 (0.31) 0.89 (0.30) 0.89 (0.52) 
Personal.norm 0.83 (0.24) 0.84 (0.24) 0.85 (0.24) 0.74 (0.37) 
Concern.climate.change 0.97 (0.25) 0.98 (0.24) 0.99 (0.24) 0.99 (0.51) 
Concern.pollution.north 1.12 (0.34) 1.11 (0.33) 1.11 (0.33) 1.41 (0.77) 
Concern.pollution.south 1.11 (0.39) 1.10 (0.38) 1.07 (0.37) 0.86 (0.57) 
Num. obs. 1543 1543 1543 1543 
Pseudo R2 0.313 0.305 0.300  
Roh    0.675*** 
 
Notes: ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05. Purchase of certificate is the dependent variable, 
coefficients are presented as odds ratios. Standard errors in parenthesis are corrected for clustered 
observations in model 5-7. Model 4 RE uses a random effects structure with the subject (n = 258) 
as the panel variable. 
 
Table A4_2: Average marginal effects and elasticities 
 All observations Beijing Shenzhen 
prices TF M U  TF M U  TF M U  
[2, 14] -0.027** (0.003) 
-0.739** 
(0.117) 
-0.034** 
(0.004) 
-0.958** 
(0.159) 
-0.018** 
(0.005) 
-0.636** 
(0.211) 
[2, 45] -0.011** (0.001) 
-1.112** 
(0.134) 
-0.012** 
(0.001) 
-1.217** 
(0.175) 
-0.008** 
(0.001) 
-1.156** 
(0.227) 
[2, 300] -0.005** (0.001) 
-2.540** 
(0.569) 
-0.006** 
(0.001) 
-3.029** 
(0.756) 
-0.003** 
(0.001) 
-2.059* 
(0.863) 
 
Notes: Average marginal effect of the price on the probability to buy (TF) and average elasticity of the probability of 
contributing (MN-). Specification with price and socio-economic covariates as the explanatory variables (model 4 in 
Table 8, except for the Beijing treatment dummy). Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for clustered 
observations. **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05.  
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Figure 5: Observed vs. predicted probabilities to purchase – model 4 and model 4 RE 
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Appendix 5: Calculation of the Lower-Bound Turnbull WTP 
 
The lower-bound Turnbull (\]) is computed in the following steps (see Haab and McConnel 2003): 
1. Calculate for each bid level b	,  = 1, … , T, the share of no answers: H	 = d	/	. 
2. Compare H	  with H	$@ , if H	 < H	$@  continue, if H	 ≥ H	$@ , these cells are pooled and the 
combined no
 
shares of these cells calculated: H	∗ = d	∗/	∗. 
3. This is repeated until a monotonously increasing cdf is formed. Set Hg$@∗ = 1. 
4. Calculate h	$@∗ = H	$@∗ − H	∗ for each bid level b	. This corresponds to a consistent estimator of 
the probability that WTP falls between the price  and price  + 1.  
5. Multiply every bid with the according probability that WTP falls between this bid and the next 
higher bid.  
6. Sum over the quantities of step 5 to obtain lower bound Turnbull WTP, which is then: 
Fi8j  = ∑ b	H	$@∗ − H	∗
g	R0 , and can be interpreted analogous to the consumer surplus 
as sum of the marginal value multiplied by the adapted quantities, or the integer over the 
quantity of a demand curve. 
7. Calculate the variance: lFi8j = ∑
m%∗n@m%∗o
j%∗
b	 − b	@pg
∗
	R@ , where 	∗  is the common 
amount of observations of the eventually pooled bid cell. 
 
Table A5_1: Lower-bound Turnbull WTP for all observations 
b	 d	 	 H	 H	∗ h	∗ Fi8j  lFi8j 
2 73 156 0.468 0.454 0.454 0.000 0.003 
5 71 161 0.441 p 
9 104 156 0.667 0.667 0.212 0.425 0.070 
14 116 161 0.720 0.720 0.054 0.484 0.031 
20 119 156 0.763 0.763 0.042 0.593 0.042 
27 129 161 0.801 0.801 0.038 0.768 0.048 
35 140 156 0.897 0.880 0.079 2.130 0.021 
45 139 161 0.863 p 
70 150 156 0.962 0.946 0.066 2.319 0.196 
100 150 161 0.932 p 
200 156 156 1.000 0.994 0.047 3.312 0.334 
300 159 161 0.988 p 
1.000 1.000 0.006 1.262 
1506 1902 1.000 11.293 0.746 
  Note: p = pooled category.  
  Linearly interpolated median = 2 + (0.5 – 0.454)*(9 - 2)/(0.667 – 0.454) = 3.51. 
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Table A5_2: Lower-bound Turnbull WTP for treatment Beijing  
b	 d	 	 H	 H	∗ h	∗ Fi8j  lFi8j 
2 44 107 0.411 0.401 0.401 0.000 0.004 
5 45 115 0.391 p 
9 68 107 0.636 0.636 0.235 0.469 0.106 
14 82 115 0.713 0.713 0.078 0.698 0.044 
20 80 107 0.748 0.748 0.035 0.485 0.063 
27 92 115 0.800 0.800 0.052 1.047 0.068 
35 96 107 0.897 0.878 0.078 2.116 0.031 
45 99 115 0.861 p 
70 103 107 0.963 0.950 0.072 2.523 0.260 
100 108 115 0.939 p 
200 107 107 1.000 0.995 0.045 3.153 0.341 
300 114 115 0.991 p 
1.000 1.000 0.005 0.901 
1038 1332 1.000 11.391 0.919 
  Note: p = pooled category.  
  Linearly interpolated median = 2 + (0.5 – 0.401)*(9 - 2)/(0.636 – 0.401) = 4.95. 
 
Table A5_3: Lower-bound Turnbull WTP for treatment Shenzhen 
b	 d	 	 H	 H	∗ h	∗ Fi8j  lFi8j 
2 29 49 0.592 0.579 0.579 0.000 0.010 
5 26 46 0.565 p 
9 36 49 0.735 0.735 0.156 0.311 0.195 
14 34 46 0.739 0.739 0.004 0.040 0.105 
20 39 49 0.796 0.796 0.057 0.795 0.119 
27 37 46 0.804 0.804 0.008 0.169 0.168 
35 44 49 0.898 0.884 0.080 2.156 0.069 
45 40 46 0.870 p 
70 47 49 0.959 0.937 0.053 1.842 0.763 
100 42 46 0.913 p 
200 49 49 1.000 0.989 0.053 3.684 1.853 
300 45 46 0.978 p 
1.000 1.000 0.011 2.105 
468 570 1.000 11.103 3.282 
  Note: p = pooled category.  
  Linearly interpolated median = 0.5*2/0.579 = 1.73. 
